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Introduction  
Globalisation can be described as a dynamic process that links the economy of a nation with the 
world economy through economic and non-economic forces. In this paper I shall confine myself to the 
economic forces of globalisation and in particular to cross-border capital flows. The process of 
globalisation has its origins in antiquity but recent innovations in information and communications 
technology has speeded up the process and also heated up the controversies surrounding the costs 
and benefits of globalisation. 
In this paper I propose to use some well tested simple economic models to examine in a cool manner 
some of the hot topics of economic globalisation. Economists have a remarkable propensity to 
disagree among themselves and this came to the attention of the literary icon Bernard Shaw and irked 
a US president demanded advice from the non-existent one-handed economist. Well economists 
disagree because there are many good ways to skin a cat. Economists use models to analyse 
complex problems and give answers that may be technically correct. But just like the answer given to 
the hot-air balloonists who got lost and asked directions, the answers may be technically correct but 
not operational ( a famous joke about economists). To make the answers operational it is necessary 
to interpret the answers in the light of country specifics.  
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Policy challenges of Economic Globalisation. 
 
I. Introduction. 
 
Globalisation can be described as a dynamic process that links the economy of a nation with 
the world economy through economic and non-economic forces. In this paper I shall confine 
myself to the economic forces of globalisation and in particular to cross-border capital flows. 
The process of globalisation has its origins in antiquity but recent innovations in information 
and communications technology has speeded up the process and also heated up the 
controversies surrounding the costs and benefits of globalisation. 
 
In this paper I propose to use some well tested simple economic models to examine in a cool 
manner some of the hot topics of economic globalisation. Economists have a remarkable 
propensity to disagree among themselves and this came to the attention of the literary icon 
Bernard Shaw and irked a US president demanded advice from the non-existent one-handed 
economist. Well economists disagree because there are many good ways to skin a cat. 
Economists use models to analyse complex problems and give answers that may be 
technically correct. But just like the answer given to the hot-air balloonists who got lost and 
asked directions, the answers may be technically correct but not operational ( a famous joke 
about economists). To make the answers operational it is necessary to interpret the answers 
in the light of country specifics.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section I briefly reviews the free market ideology 
embodied in Washington Consensus policies advocated by pro-globalisers. Section II 
provides an operational definition of economic globalisation. Section III reviews a major force 
in globalisation -trade liberalisation through the prism of trade theoretic models. Section IV 
explains using a gravity model how revolutionary changes in information technology have 
turbo charged the globalisation process recently. Section V presents the pro-globalisers’ case 
for capital account liberalisation drawing on the logic of the neoclassical growth model. 
Section VI reviews the mechanics of how capital flow reversals precipitate financial crises 
under globalisation. Section VII policy measures advocated to combat financial crises at the 
national level. Section VIII discusses some proposals for reshaping the international financial 
architecture. Section IX discusses some challenging macroeconomic policy design issues 
facing globalising economies like Sri Lanka. Section X concludes the paper. 
 
The process of globalisation has recently been mentored the so called Washington 
Consensus policies or the free market ideology enunciated by a trio of institutions located in 
Washington: The International Monetary Fund (IMF), The World Bank and the US Treasury 
(Stiglitz 2006). Developing countries the Washington Consensus free market policies in order 
to qualify for adjustment assistance needed to tide over economic crises. These free market 
policies involve: trade liberalisation (reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers on trade in goods 
and services), privatisation (sale of state-owned enterprises to the private sector), 
deregulation (removal of controls over businesses), capital account liberalisation (removal of 
restrictions on cross-border capital mobility).  
 
Anti-globalisers allege that aim of the Washington Consensus policies is to spread free 
market capitalism in developing economies. Free market policies are based on the belief that 
the price-mechanism or Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ will allocate scarce resources 
efficiently, maximise growth which would trickle down to the masses increasing their welfare. 
Anti-globalisers contend that free market policies or the invisible hand does not work in 
developing countries because of market failure due to incomplete markets and imperfect 
information. Therefore, anti-globalisers perceive that government intervention has a role to 
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play in the efficient allocation of resources because the malfunctioning of the invisible hand or 
the price mechanism.  
 
II. A definition of economic globalization. 
 
Globalization is an on-going multi-dimensional dynamic process that integrates the domestic 
economy with the international economy through economic and non-economic forces. In this 
paper I confine myself to a review of the major economic forces of globalisation as listed 
below: 
  
1. Trade liberalization. 
2. Technology transfer. 
3. Capital flows. 
 
There are, of course, other important economic forces such migration and non-economic 
forces such as environmental degradation and global warming, cultural homogenisation, 
political globalisation and the spread of terrorism, which are not discussed in this paper but 
dealt with elsewhere (Bhagwati 2004). In the discussion of economic globalisation I have 
focussed attention mainly on capital mobility as it is the major force driving economic 
globalisation currently. 
  
Globalization is not a new process its origins are lost in antiquity. The first phase of 
globalisation or Globalisation Mark I was spearheaded by the nation state. At the end of 
World War II Globalisation Mark II was propelled mainly by the emergence Multinational 
Corporations (MNCs). Globalisation Mark III, the current phase of globalisation is propelled by 
the revolutionary changes in information technology (IT). The IT revolution has turbo charged 
cross border capital flows and these capital flows are at the centre of financial crises that 
have rocked the world economy in recent times. In the sequel the various forces that underpin 
the process of economic globalisation will be critically reviewed using some rudimentary 
economic models. 
 
III. Trade liberalisation  
 
Trade liberalisation or the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers is one of the major forces 
driving economic integration of nations or globalisation. The pure theory of international trade 
establishes analytically that free trade is best because it maximises national and global 
welfare. David Ricardo (1817) used the logic of a simple two-country, two-good, one-factor 
(2x2x1) model to demonstrate that a country by specialising in the production for export the 
good in which had a comparative advantage (that is the good the country could produce 
relatively cheaply) and import the other good, the country could maximise national welfare 
(consumption of both goods). Simultaneously the other country also maximise its national 
welfare and in the two country world economy global welfare would be maximised.  
 
Extending the trade model to two factors instead of one as in the case of the Ricardian model, 
the factor endowments (Heckscher-Ohlin) model and explain that the good that uses 
intensively the relatively abundant factor becomes the comparative advantage good. By 
exporting the comparative advantage good and importing the other good both countries can 
maximise national and global welfare as before. The factor endowment model shows that free 
trade makes the owners of the factor that uses the factor intensively in the export good gain 
while the owners of the other factor lose because of free trade. Therefore, free trade creates 
potential winners and losers. Unless suitable policies are implemented to redistribute income 
from potential gainers to losers, free trade could increase income inequality and give rise to 
social and economic tensions (Samuelson 1962). 
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The above free trade models clearly confirm that free trade is a positive-sum-game as it 
maximises national and international welfare. But we find that world trade is restricted by 
protection through the imposition of tariffs, quotas and subsidies. Trade models demonstrate 
that protectionist measures would be welfare eroding but nonetheless they are widespread in 
the real world. The political economy of trade shows that this is because ‘special interest’ 
groups like the farm and steel lobbies succeed in enhancing their welfare at the expense of 
national welfare through collective action (Krugman and Obstfeld 2006). 
 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) has attempted to promote globalization through trade 
liberalisation by engaging in successive rounds of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTNs). 
The current of MTN, the 9th round or the Doha round is currently deadlocked because 
advanced countries (US, Europe, Japan) have shown a reluctance to scale down the massive 
farm subsidies that are given to some agricultural goods in which developing countries enjoy 
a comparative advantage (i.e. can produce relatively cheaply). The political economy of free 
trade shows that advance countries while engaging in the rhetoric of free trade fail to reduce 
protection because they pander to demands of special interest groups as these groups 
contribute to the re-election maximising strategies of incumbent governments. 
  
Developing countries like Sri Lanka also pursued protectionist policies in the mid-1960s to 
promote infant industries under a strategy of Import Substituting industrialisation (ISI). The ISI 
policies were ill-designed and attempted to produce through state owned enterprises goods 
for the domestic market replacing imports. These ISI industries did not have a comparative 
advantage and were uncompetitive in the world market and doomed to fail. About the same 
time a group of High Performance Asian Economies (HPAEs) had adopted the strategy of 
Export Oriented Industrialisation (EOI) where production was geared for export to the world 
market. The EOI strategy delivered spectacular growth rates to the HPAEs and they were 
hailed as the Asian Miracle economies (World Bank 1993).  
 
When Sri Lanka obtained political independence in 1948, in per capita income terms Sri 
Lanka was far ahead of the Asian Miracle economies. But the pursuit of protectionist policies 
pushed the economy to a slow growth locus. However in 1977 when Sri Lanka adopted the 
EOI strategy they economy switched on to a fast growth locus and growth and per capita 
income increased dramatically. The EOI policies adopted in Sri Lanka transformed the 
economy from a plantation economy to a manufactures export economy or from a “banana 
republic to a pyjama republic”. The spectacular increase in per capita income or welfare was 
accompanied by increasing income inequality or the widening gap between the rich and poor 
as predicted by the trade models, because of the failure to implement effective redistribution 
policies. The widening income inequality gave rise to civil unrest and increased ethnic 
tensions. 
 
The biggest blow to the policies of globalisation through trade liberalisation strategies was 
delivered in mid-1998, not by Sri Lanka, but by the spectacular collapse of the much 
panegyrised Asian miracle economies. The miracle Asian economies were devastated by a 
series of financial crises due to the sudden reversal of short-term capital inflows. Overnight 
the Asian miracle economies were transformed into debacle economies. The crisis contagion 
from the debacle Asian economies rapidly spread worldwide threatening the stability the 
global financial system. The sudden collapse of the Asian miracle due to the reversal of 
capital inflows raised serious doubts about the wisdom capital account liberalisation 
advocated by the Washington Consensus policies. 
 
The next section reviews the role played by the information technology revolution in 
galvanising both the globalisation process and cross-border capital mobility.  
  
IV. Information technology revolution  
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The information technology (IT) revolution got turbo-charged over the past couple of decades 
because of the convergence of innovations in tele-matics (computers, satellite, fibre optic) 
technologies. These IT innovations resulted in dramatic reductions in the costs of transport 
and telecommunications, thereby overcoming the ‘tyranny of distance’ or ‘flattening the world’ 
(Friedman 2006). The gravity model demonstrates how the IT revolution by reducing the 
tyranny of distance bolstered the trade in goods and assets between national economies, 
strengthening the globalisation process. The gravity model postulates that the trade between 
two countries is directly related to the size of their output or GDP and inversely related to the 
distance between the two countries. When the cost of transport and communications falls, the 
distance between the two countries falls resulting in an increase in the trade between the two 
countries. In symbols the above predictions can be stylised by the gravity model as follows: 
 
Tij = YiYj/Dij; where Yi: GDP country i , Yi: GDP country j, 
 
Tij: Trade between country i & j,  Dij: Distance between country i & j. 
      
The widespread adoption of the new IT flattened the world and facilitated the computerisation 
and robotification of production leading to the emergence of the ‘new economy’ in countries 
like the USA and Australia (Karunaratne 2006a). 
The IT revolution unleashed 10 forces to flatten the world: the fall of the Berlin wall and 
opening of Windows, the world-wide web, workflow software, uploading, outsourcing, 
offshoring, supply-chaining, in- forming and the steroid of digitising and transmission of value-
laden information (text, voice, and image) at low cost and high speed regardless of distance 
(Friedman 2006). The overcoming of the tyranny of distance and establishment of a seamless 
world by the new connectivity delivered by the IT revolution speeded up the globalisation 
process. It empowered both corporations and individuals to collaborate in new forms of 
trading activities such as e-commerce, e-business, tele-conferencing, tele-marketing, etc., 
galvanising the process of globalisation. 
 
However, anti-globalisers despair that the new plug-and-play world delivered by the IT 
revolution has not enhanced the living conditions of 80 percent of the world population that 
lives in the developing countries on less that 2 US dollars a day (the World Bank definition of 
poverty). The anti-globalisers allege that the IT revolution has exacerbated the digital divide or 
the gap between the information rich and information poor. They point out that except for a 
few isolated episodes like the use of mobile phones by the Grameen banks in Bangladesh to 
deliver micro-credit to women the potential to harness the new IT to upgrade the delivery of 
education, health and medical services to the poor remains untapped.  The IT revolution has 
enabled big business and MNCs to increase cross-border capital flows or the trade in assets 
to new heights.  
 
V. Capital mobility. 
 
The most potent force currently driving economic globalisation is not trade liberalisation or the 
IT revolution but capital mobility. Yet the strength of cross-border capital flows when 
measured by metrics such as: interest parity conditions, savings investment correlations 
(Feldstein and Horioka 1980), exchange rate volatility (Meese and Rogoff 1983), is way below 
its maximum potential. Capital mobility still has latent potential waiting to be harnessed for 
growth and development. 
 
Capital flows from relatively capital abundant advance economies to capital scarce 
developing economies occur because it facilitates the diversification of asset portfolios 
resulting in the maximising of returns and the minimising of risks. Portfolio diversification 
minimises risks by ‘not putting all your eggs in one basket’. The capital inflows from advance 
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to developing countries can boost the national saving rate and increase the per capita income 
or standard of living permanently and the growth rate temporarily as predicted by the 
neoclassical growth model (Solow 1956). Therefore capital flows by increasing growth has the 
potential to increase the welfare of 80 per cent of the world’s population that lives in 
developing countries. It should be noted that the Washington Consensus policies that 
advocate capital account liberalisation has the imprimatur of the neoclassical growth model. 
However, when pro and anti-globalisers clash over the costs and benefits of capital account 
liberalisation often they do not clarify what type of capital flows they are referring and 
therefore they produce more heat than light.   
 
Broadly speaking capital flows from advance to developing countries can be classified into 
two types: short-term and long-term capital flows. Short-term capital flows are mainly debt 
financed, while long-term capital flows are equity finance or Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 
Short-term capital flows are hot money that flows in and in search of quick speculative profits. 
While long-term capital flows in the shape equity or FDI brings in its train the much sought 
after magic package of technology, managerial and marketing skills. Short-term capital flows 
and long-term capital flows are like good and bad cholesterol and both pro and anti-
globalisers agree that long-term capital flows can play a vital role in promoting growth and 
improving per capita as predicted by the Solow growth model. But short-term capital flows are 
reversible and wreak economic havoc and these flows are the whipping boy of anti-
globalisers.   
 
The Solow growth accounting equation (Mankiw 2007) has been empirically validated for 
some of miracle Asian economies and the results reveal that growth was fuelled by the 
increase in factor inputs or perspiration rather than by the increase of total factor productivity 
or inspiration. Therefore, it was conjectured that the Asian economic miracle would peter out 
because of the operation of the law of diminishing returns (Young 1995, Krugman 1994). 
However, in retrospect, the Asian economic miracle was shattered in mid-1997 not by the law 
of diminishing returns but by the sudden reversal of short-term capital inflows. The reversal of 
capital flows engulfed the Asian economies in a full-blown financial crisis and the crisis 
contagion spread rapidly across the world threatening the stability of the global financial 
system. The causes and mechanics underpinning the various financial crises that rocked the 
economies and stifled the globalisation process have been stylised in a few key models which 
are briefly reviewed in the next section.  
 
VI. Models of financial crises 
 
Globalisation and the cross-border hyper mobility of capital have increased the vulnerability of 
open economies to financial crises caused by the sudden reversal of speculative short-term 
capital flows. Three key models of financial crises arising from speculative attacks and 
collapse of the currency peg are stylised based on country experiences over the past three 
decades.   
 
The first-generation models are based on the experience financial crises that ravaged some 
Latin American economies and the mechanics are stylised in a canonical model speculative 
attack model (Krugman 1979). The crisis occurred in these Latin American economies 
because of increase in the budget deficits caused by expansionary fiscal policy. The budget 
deficits had to be financed by running down foreign exchange reserves. The depletion of 
reserves triggered a speculative attack causing the collapse of the currency peg, unleashing a 
full-blown financial and banking crisis and economic disruption. 
 
The second-generation models are based on the experience of the malfunctioning of the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). The origin of the financial crisis is not linked to 
bad macroeconomic policies and weakening of fundamentals, but rather to sudden changes 
in market psychology resulting in panic and herd behaviour causing rapid capital flight or an 
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outflow of short-term capital (Diamond and Dybvig 1983). Capital outflow depleted foreign 
exchange reserves and brought about a speculative attack on the currency peg. These 
models exhibited multiple equilibria and demonstrated that the lack of credible monetary 
policy providing the incentive for speculators to launch their attack on the currency, 
precipitating a financial crisis (Obstfeld 1996).  
 
The third-generation models based on the experience of the Asian financial crisis attributes a 
key role to moral hazard behaviour by foreign creditors who under implicit guarantees lend to 
domestic financial intermediaries. The domestic financial intermediaries in the absence of 
prudential regulation re-lend to crony capitalists who invest in risky projects that eventually go 
belly-up. When this occurs the foreign creditors panic and refuse to rollover their loans 
triggering a massive  capital inflow reversal which exhausts foreign exchange reserves and 
precipitates a full-blown financial crisis (Sarno and Taylor 2002, Krugman 1998). It is 
noteworthy in all the different models the sudden reversal of short-term capital inflows is the 
main villain behind the devastating financial crises. 
 
The next two sections of the paper discuss the policies aimed at reducing the vulnerability of 
the globalising economy to financial crises at the national and international levels, 
respectively.  
 
VII. National level crisis prevention policies. 
 
After the Asian crisis the wisdom of liberalising the capital account as recommended by the 
Washington Consensus policies became the focal point on the debate on globalisation. 
Countries like India and China pursued gradualist policies of capital account liberalisation and 
appear to have avoided serious financial crises that engulfed Russia and Argentina that 
opened capital account following a cold-turkey approach bringing in its wake economic 
turmoil. The sequel enumerates some policy initiatives that could be undertaken at the 
national level to minimise the vulnerability to financial crises due to sudden capital flow 
reversals. 
 
1. Develop sound banking and financial institutions so that prudential supervision 
and regulation, transparency and good governance will minimise moral hazard 
behaviour and risky borrowing by crony capitalists. 
2. Sequence the liberalisation of the capital account after the establishment of 
sound banking and financial institutions. An follow a gradualist rather than a cold-
turkey approach to opening the capital account, giving policymakers the chance 
to take corrective action or ‘throw sand on the wheels of international finance’ if 
and when it becomes hyperactive. 
3. Reduce the vulnerability to liquidity/rollover risk and balance sheet risk. This 
requires that policymakers monitor appropriate short-term debt to foreign 
exchange reserve ratios rather than short-term debt to import ratios. Both 
maturity mismatch and currency mismatches between debts and return from 
investments that trigger financial crises should be averted. 
4. Support policies that nurture the establishment a climate conducive to business 
investment and therefore long-term capital inflow (FDI). This involves support for 
policies that uphold the rule of law, property rights and political stability. 
5. Meet Basle Accord capital adequacy ratios designed minimise credit and market 
risks. Here the regulators aim to ensure that there is sufficient amount capital 
relative to outstanding loans. 
 
Anti-globalisers are critical about the stabilising effects achieving short-term debt to reserve 
ratio of unity. Because this generates reverse capital flows that benefits the lending nation 
and inflicting growth retarding losses on the borrowing nation.  The following numerical 
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example illustrates the operation of these adverse flow mechanics. If a nation borrows $100 
million at an interest rate of 10% from USA to meet the requirements of short-term debt to 
reserve ration, there should be a back with $100 million reserves which could be in form US 
T-bills that earn 5%. The net effect of this transaction is a reverse flow of $5 million to USA. 
The opportunity cost of this capital outflow is much greater than $5 million as this money 
could have been spent development projects in education, medical and health care. 
 
Anti-globalisers also contend that Basle type capital adequacy of debt to total debt ratios 
creates a bias towards riskier short-term borrowing than long-term borrowing. Such short-term 
borrowing can result in bank runs if the lenders panic and decide to pull out their money 
simultaneously. 
 
The increase securitisation (repackaging of bank assets into more marketable forms by 
nonbank institutions) also poses challenges for effective prudential and thus underscores the 
need to encourage long-term rather than short-term capital flows. 
  
VIII.   Proposals for reshaping the international financial architecture. 
 
The Asian economic crisis also led to proposals for a radical reshaping of the international 
financial architecture rather than just tinkering at the edges by improving transparency, 
surveillance and corporate governance. Some of the proposals are enumerated below: 
 
1. It has been argued that the IMF which was designed to offer assistance to member 
nations to tide over temporary balance of payments crises was geared to implement 
stabilisation policies. The IMF was not institutionally geared to formulate policies to 
tackle systemic breakdowns. The short-term pro-cyclical policies implemented by the 
IMF worsened the economic travails of crisis ravaged economies. The repeated 
policy mistakes by the IMF have led anti-globalisers to call for its abolition. 
2. The IMF not only erred in prescribing the wrong fiscal policies but also the tight 
monetary policy aimed designed to raising interest rate and attract short-term capital 
flows were misplaced as high interest rates made debt servicing by the borrowing 
nation problematic, whilst safeguarding the interests of foreign creditors. Again 
because the IMF has repeatedly acted as a lackey of foreign lenders rather than 
developing country borrowers, anti-globalisers have called for a complete change in 
the IMF policy mindset or its abolition. 
3. The bailout packages designed by the IMF basically transferred the risks incurred by 
foreign creditors as a result of their moral hazard lending to the borrowing nation. The 
bailouts were eventually financed by the taxpayers by the poor countries and again 
showed that the IMF policies were inimical to the interests of developing countries as 
they were pro-foreign creditors and anti-poor. 
4. Anti-globalisers argued that bankruptcies that followed in the wake of a financial crisis 
were due systemic failures and not mismanagement. International bankruptcy laws 
should therefore be reformed to make foreign creditors share in the restructuring of 
bankrupt firms by buying equity in them. 
5. Anti-globalisers also contended that giving functions of functions of automatic bailouts 
would only encourage moral hazard behaviour by the foreign creditors. During the 
Asian Crisis the IMF bailouts were too little too late and the IMF had shown that it was 
incapable of acting as an effective lender of last resort and play a useful role in crisis 
prevention. This provided yet another argument for the radical change in the policy 
mindset of the IMF and some critics called for its abolition (Niskanen 1999). 
 
The reform of the international financial architecture has led to calls for revamping the global 
reserve system by issuing a new form of fiat money called “global greenbacks” similar 
Keynes’s bancor. The global greenbacks could be used to finance global public goods and 
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demonstrate that the international financial architecture could be used to stabilise the global 
economy whilst delivering equity and social justice (Stiglitz 2006:266). 
 
IX. Macroeconomic policy challenges  
 
In configuring the correct macroeconomic policy-mix for a globalising economy like Sri Lanka 
policymakers need to recognise the challenges posed by the  existence of the ‘open economy 
trilemma’ or the ‘impossible trinity’ (Obstfeld 1998). This trilemma arises because 
policymakers at given juncture, can simultaneously choose only two out of the following three 
policy regimes: 
 
1. Exchange rate stability. 
2. Capital mobility. 
3. Independent monetary policy. 
 
Until recently policymakers in Sri Lanka chose options 1 and 3, i.e. the pegged exchange rate 
and independent monetary policy to address short-term macroeconomic stabilisation goals. 
However, the floating of the exchange rate (i.e. allowing market forces to determine the 
exchange rate or price of foreign currency instead of it being set by the Central Bank) opens 
up a new policy ball game. 
 
Floating the exchange rate gives policymakers in an open economy like Sri Lanka more 
scope to liberalise the capital account and tap into the global pool of saving by encouraging 
long-term rather than short-term capital inflows. Capital controls are difficult to administer and 
often evade regulation either through innovative ploys or through bribery and corruption.  
The ‘original sin’ or incurring foreign debt in hard currency can increase the burden of foreign 
debt when measured in domestic currency if exchange rate suddenly depreciates 
(Eichengreen and Hausman 1999). The original sin and exchange rate volatility instils the 
‘fear of floating’ in developing countries (Calvo and Reinhart 2002). However, Sri Lanka has 
decided to bite the bullet and has now opted to choose the float in the bipolar solution set 
available to a globalised economy (Fischer 2001).  
 
The free float of the rupee has opened up new policy challenges and opportunities. I shall 
briefly touch on two of them. First, there is the opportunity to design policies to harness the 
benefits of the correct brand of capital flows and bridge the widening saving investment gap 
and galvanise long-term growth as foreshadowed by the Solow growth model. Second, a new 
policy challenge has emerged with the removal of the exchange rate anchor that imposed 
monetary policy discipline and policy credibility under the pegged exchange rate regime. 
Under the new floating exchange rate with capital mobility there is scope to implement the 
policy package of ‘Inflation targeting with Central Bank Independence (CBI)’ as suggested 
elsewhere (Karunaratne 2006b). The implementation of this new policy package will rein in Sri 
Lanka’s galloping inflation by honing down inflationary expectations.   Inflationary 
expectations are undoubtedly feeding Sri Lanka’s high inflation rate because the current 
monetary policy configuration allows for discretionary policy and time-inconsistent behaviour 
driven by the political business cycle. Some conservative policymakers may consider the new 
policy approach as radical and not geared to the needs for developing economy like Sri 
Lanka. It should noted that many born again Asian miracle economies have joined the 
inflation targeters league. These Asian developing economies have demonstrated that 
inflation targeting using Taylor rate rules yield rich dividends in the form low inflation with high 
growth.  
 
X. Concluding comments 
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The forces of globalisation have the potential to offer developing countries a cornucopia. The 
implementation of a proper macroeconomic policy-mix is important to achieve short-term 
stabilisation goals that underpin the achievement of long-term growth without experiencing 
the trauma of a financial crisis. However, it should be borne in mind that the bottom line in 
evaluating whether economic policies have harnessed the benefits of the dynamic forces of 
globalisation needs to be judged on the basis of delivery in relation to growth with equity. In 
the past globalisation has been mismanaged and it has failed to deliver on growth with equity. 
But “We can make globalisation, work not just for the rich and powerful but for all 
people,……….We have already waited far too long. The time to begin is now.” (Stiglitz 
2006:292).   
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